










Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/139767                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 




I investigate the risk implications of bank capital requirements in the presence of
shadow banks. I show that in response to higher capital charges as an exogenous shock
to loan retention, banks originate riskier loans. The probability of ex post borrower
default rises by 8% (50% in relative terms). Defaults are absorbed by shadow banks.
I uncover a novel pecking order of credit risk transfer with strategic adverse selection
of banks vis-à-vis shadow banks. The riskier loans are sold to shadow banks with less
monitoring expertise, but higher credit risk is not ex ante priced. I also find that the rise
in default risk operates through lax screening ex ante as opposed to lax monitoring ex post.
These findings collectively show that in the originate-to-distribute system, bank capital
regulation distorts screening and triggers a credit risk transfer. While banks become safer,
the credit risk originated by banks and borne by the shadow banking system is larger.
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1 Introduction
Regulators around the world responded to the financial crisis by imposing an overhaul of strin-
gent bank capital requirements. The underlying view is that under-regulation is what leads to
excessive bank risk-taking. However, there is evidence that banking regulations move financial
intermediation into the shadow banking system. This generates the concern and controversy
that disintermediation might counteract the main purpose of bank capital requirements that
is to limit bank risk-taking. Despite such concerns, there is limited understanding of how bank
capital requirements and shadow banks interact. In this paper, I study (i) how bank capital
requirements affect bank lending and credit risk in the presence of shadow banks, and (ii) how
credit risk migrates to shadow banks as a result of bank capital requirements.
Considering shadow banks in bank regulation is important because of their substantial role
in the economy. Shadow banks (e.g. structured investment vehicles also known as CLOs,
pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, corporations, private equity firms, and insurance
companies) have dominated the U.S. syndicated loan markets since early 2000’s. Through
syndication and secondary loan markets, banks sold them a large portion of loans that they
originated. Their investment concentrates in leveraged loans1, broadly defined as loans to
borrowers with high leverage and low credit quality. Ivashina and Sun (2011) report that their
participation in this market increased more than 12 times from 2001 to 2007. According to
Bloomberg, the total U.S. syndicated loan issuance in 2017 was about $2.5 trillion, of which
more than half, about $1.5 trillion was classified as leveraged. In turn, $1.1 trillion of syndicated
loans were classified as institutional, meaning that they were meant to be distributed to non-
banks. Relatedly, shadow banks tripled their market share in the mortgage markets from 14%
to 38% during 2007-2015 (Buchak et. al., 2018). Hence, they are important players in private
debt markets where banks traditionally originated loans and kept them on their balance sheets.
The main concern about shadow banks is the view that banks are special monitors. To
the extent that bank monitoring is valuable, shadow banks might negatively impact the role
of private debt to screen and monitor borrowers. The banking literature assumes that banks
1The definition of leveraged loan varies by institution. Dealscan defines a leveraged loan as any loan with a
credit rating of BB+ or lower and any unrated loan. They are also called high-yield loans.
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have a comparative monitoring advantage (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984; Ra-
makrishnam and Thakor, 1984; and Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Monitoring includes screening
the creditworthiness of borrowers ex ante, and preventing them from behaving opportunisti-
cally ex post. Shadow banks, on the other hand, tend to have less information, expertise, and
incentives than banks to monitor (Bord and Santos, 2011; Wang and Xia, 2014; Becker and
Ivashina, 2016; and Billett et. al., 2016). Consistent with this view, prior work links shadow
banks to weaker underwriting standards in securitization (e.g., Keys et. al., 2010; Bord and
Santos, 2011, and Wang and Xia, 2014). Both academics and practitioners also blame shadow
banks for being partially responsible for the 2007 financial crisis. Ultimately, how bank capital
requirements affect credit risk in the presence of shadow banks is an unanswered empirical
question, one which I investigate in this paper.
Identifying the impact of bank capital requirements on credit risk is challenging because
bank capital requirements are not random and counter-cyclical. They go up in downturns due
to higher estimates in default risk. Furthermore, cyclical changes in the economy simultane-
ously impact shadow banks, and borrower demand. For example, in downturns banks lend less
to risky firms in order to diversify their loan portfolios — while at the same time these firms
deleverage due to poor investment opportunities. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle the effects
of bank capital requirements from other changes that simultaneously affect bank lending and
borrowers’ default risk.
To investigate the impact of bank capital requirements on bank lending and credit risk in
the presence of shadow banks, I study a natural experiment in the U.S. leveraged loan markets
— a market segment where shadow banks are key players. The experiment is Basel II that
provides an exogenous shock to capital charges associated with speculative-grade loans. Foreign
banking laws require multinational banks to implement Basel II on a worldwide consolidated
basis, and much earlier than the U.S. domestic banks. The foreign bank subsidiaries assign
higher capital charges to speculative-grade loans, and regulatory capital is calculated as a
fraction of total risk-weighted assets that are aggregated on a consolidated basis. I compare
the speculative-grade loans originated by the U.S. subsidiaries of non-U.S. banks relative to U.S.
domestic banks around the shock. This setting is suitable for identification because changes
in capital charges are orthogonal to borrower fundamentals, shadow banking demand, and
macroeconomic conditions. Exploiting this regulation as an exogenous shock to loan retention,
I investigate changes in the credit risk of newly originated loans, and in the syndicate structure
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as a risk-transfer mechanism.
I first validate the empirical setting by showing evidence that banks subject to regulatory
reforms find it costlier to originate speculative-grade loans. At the extensive margin, affected
banks become less likely to originate loans with speculative-grade credit ratings after the re-
form. They also lose market share in this market segment. At the intensive margin, they sell
larger portions of the new speculative-grade loans that they originate. The loan retention de-
creases by 7% (27% decrease relative to the mean). Furthermore, the probability that affected
banks originate speculative-grade loans with non-bank lead arrangers after the reform increases
by 12% (doubled relative to the mean).
Next, I investigate the impact of risk-sensitive capital regulation on banks’ incentives to
monitor borrowers’ credit risk. To understand the relation with credit risk, I examine the
ex post default of borrowers — controlling for observables at loan origination. My empirical
approach is similar in spirit to Keys et. al. (2010) and Benmelech et. al. (2012). If the
regulation leads banks to monitor less, I expect these loans to exhibit a higher probability of
ex post borrower default. I hypothesize that the negative shock to loan retention will map to
an increase in default risk. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that under the new rules,
new loans originated by affected banks are 8% more likely to be followed by borrower default
within five years of loan origination compared to similar loans not subject to these rules2 (50%
increase relative to the mean). Consistent with shadow banks being less likely to compensate
for the weaker monitoring by lead banks, I also show that the increase in defaults is confined to
non-bank loans. In particular, loans perform the worst when they are originated with non-bank
lead arrangers. I find no increase in defaults for loans originated by, and distributed within
banking intermediaries.
I distinguish ex ante screening from ex post monitoring. In terms of the former, I show
that banks subject to higher capital requirements extend loans to more indebted borrowers.
However, the impact on default risk is large and positive even after controlling for observable
sources of risk, including the ex ante indebtedness of the borrower. I then investigate whether
banks are unaware of the risk that they originate because they exert less screening effort. To
this end, I test whether defaults are higher on loans that are more likely to require banks to
collect soft information. Instead, I find that loans extended to new borrowers (which I measure
by the length of their relation), or loans originated by less informed banks (which I measure
2The typical leveraged loan in the U.S. has on average a 5 year maturity.
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by the longevity of experience in the syndicated loan markets) do not perform differentially
worse.
I further provide evidence of adverse selection between banks and shadow banks at loan
origination. I document that defaults are stronger for loans originated with non-banks who have
less monitoring expertise (which I measure by the average time of non-banks in the corporate
loan market and borrower industry) and less private information on borrowers (which I proxy by
the average length of relation and lack of bank affiliations). I also find that this higher credit risk
is not ex ante priced. The analysis is agnostic about the efficiency of trades from the perspective
of uninformed shadow banks. It is possible that the latter sell their stakes at a premium in the
secondary loan markets and do not make a loss. Answering this question requires knowledge
of trades and expected returns for each syndicate participant. However, no dataset that I am
aware of contains this information. In the Appendix, I investigate potential explanations. I
show that banks with high historical defaults become less likely to distribute loans to shadow
banks in the secondary loan markets. This is consistent with the view that shadow banks learn,
and that although risky loans are originated with uninformed shadow banks, adverse selection
is broadly internalized in the secondary loan markets – reducing subsequent liquidity.
Finally, I investigate whether there is an increase in defaults because banks monitor less ex
post, leading to risky behaviour on behalf of the borrowers. First, I search for direct evidence
of lax monitoring through changes in covenants. Covenants give banks the ability to monitor
borrowers by changing contract terms in default states, but they are costly in dispersed syndi-
cates because they require the effort to renegotiate. I find that banks relax financial covenants,
in particular those that restrict leverage. However, when I examine firm behaviour after loan
origination, I do not find evidence of moral hazard. Firms use the debt financing that they
receive to increase debt maturity and hoard cash. These results suggest that the increase in
default risk is due to lax screening ex ante as opposed to lax monitoring ex post.
The central finding of this paper is that banks react to higher capital charges by reducing
loan retention, originating riskier loans, and transferring credit risk to shadow banks. There
is also evidence of strategic adverse selection between banks vis-à-vis shadow banks in the
credit risk transfer. Borrowers under the new rules exhibit higher defaults (and bankruptcies)
– but these defaults are internalized by shadow banks. I exploit information asymmetry and
incentives between different parties within syndicates to disentangle the source of monitoring
frictions: while incentives (stakes) — as opposed to information (screening) — drive the mon-
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itoring behaviour of banks, information (expertise) — as opposed to incentives (stakes) — is
the driving force of the monitoring attitude of shadow banks in the credit risk transfer. Put
differently, loans originated by banks with weaker incentives, and distributed to shadow banks
with lesser information, exhibit more defaults under the new rules. Both channels shut down
for bank participants. Although banks relax covenants, I do not find evidence of moral hazard
on behalf of the borrowers.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the link between bank capital and shadow
banks. The closest paper is Irani et. al. (2017). Using Basel III as an exogenous source
of variation in regulatory bank capital, they find that weakly-capitalized banks reduce loan
exposure in the secondary loan markets, and that shadow banks pick up the slack. They also
show that this credit reallocation is linked to higher secondary loan market volatility. The
novelty of this paper is the focus on credit risk. Using Basel II as an exogenous shock to loan
retention, I show that banks originate riskier speculative-grade loans, and that they transfer
them to shadow banks.
Second, this paper adds to the literature on risk-sensitive capital requirements. Prior work
established a negative link between capital charges and bank lending in the European economy.
Behn, Haselmann and Wachtel (2016) show that in response to an exogenous shock to credit
risk in Germany, capital charges have gone up, and that banks reduced lending. Similarly,
Fraisse, Lé, and Thesmar (2015) find that an increase in risk-sensitive capital requirements is
associated with a decline in bank lending. In a related paper, Behn, Haselmann and Vig (2016)
document that under the risk-sensitive capital design in Germany, risk weights are lower, and
that default rates are higher. I contribute by studying risk-sensitive capital requirements in a
market where shadow banks are key players. I show that these requirements lead to an increase
in default risk, and a risk transfer to shadow banks.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on shadow banks in the U.S. syndicated loan
markets. Prior work investigated whether shadow banks distort banks’ monitoring incentives
during securitization. The evidence is mixed. For example, Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina
(2012) show that banks do not select lower-quality loans for securitization. Similarly, Shiv-
dasani and Wang (2011) do not find evidence that LBO deals funded by CLOs underperformed.
However, Bord and Santos (2015) document that securitization is linked to higher default rates.
Wang and Xia (2014), on the other hand, show that securitization distort banks’ incentives to
monitor borrowers ex post. The novelty of this paper is to investigate the interaction of shadow
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banks and bank capital requirements. I document strategic adverse selection between banks
and shadow banks in the credit risk transfer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental set-
ting; hypotheses; identification strategy and data; Section 3 reports the results; and Section 4
concludes.
2 Empirical Design and Data
2.1 Experimental Setting
In this paper, I study Basel II as a natural experiment. The previous Basel I grouped assets
into different risk categories, and assigned them a uniform capital charge. For example, all
corporate loans had a capital charge of 100%. The total required capital was calculated as a
fraction of risk-weighted assets. One concern with this framework was the incentive of banks to
reach-for-yield. Basel II, published in June 2004, removed the uniform capital charge feature
of Basel I. It imposed a risk-sensitive capital design, requiring banks to apply higher capital
charges to riskier assets3.
The Basel II feature that I exploit in this paper is the increase in capital charges for
speculative-grade loans. Under the standardized approach (known as SA), capital charges are
linked to external credit ratings, and those for speculative-grade loans are raised to 150% (Fig-
ure 1). Under the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) — where banks develop their own
risk models – the relative capital charges for non-investment-grade loans also increase. The
U.S. banks securitize non-investment-grade loans as a means of regulatory arbitrage, and secu-
ritization exposures require capital based on external credit ratings (Figure 2). Furthermore,




3See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988, 2006) for the Basel agreements.
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Exploiting Basel II as an exogenous shock to capital charges, I analyze the U.S. speculative-
grade loans around the change. The setting has two features suitable for identification: it is
exogenous and staggered. The U.S. subsidiaries of non-US multinational banks implemented
Basel II because of home-country laws and much earlier than U.S domestic banks. Once the
home regulator of a non-US bank implements Basel, the bank as a whole — including the US
subsidiaries — calculate and report regulatory capital under the new standards. Hence, the
US subsidiaries generate the risk-weighting parameters under Basel II. I collect information
on the adoption of Basel-based laws from Central Banks’ publications and press releases, and
BIS annual progress reports. I also read SEC filings and annual reports of non-US banks to
check the year where non-US multinational banks with U.S. subsidiaries are affected. Banks
typically report preparing as soon as their home Central Bank announces the transposition of
Basel into national law. I use these years as my event times in my empirical design. Table 1
reports the countries and years at which Central Banks announce the adoption of Basel, and
Figure 3 presents the affected countries worldwide.
[Table 1 here]
[Figure 3 here]
The U.S. domestic banks implemented Basel II in 2014 – much later than the non-US banks
– because it was immediately blocked. The U.S. regulators initially announced that they would
require the largest and internationally active U.S. banks (i.e., with assets exceeding $250 billion
or foreign exposures exceeding $10 billion) to adopt Basel II advanced internal ratings-based
approach (A-IRB), but this announcement generated competitive concerns. The main issue
was that Basel gives unfair competitive advantage to largest U.S. banking organizations. The
Quantitative Impact Study of Basel II (2005) showed that it would result in 15% drop in the
amount of required regulatory capital for these banks. To address this concern, US regulators
delayed the proposed rule-making until late 2007. Although the final rule was accepted in 2008,
it included revisions which would prevent significant capital reductions, including a minimum
three-year transition period (i.e., parallel-run), and floors on the amount of capital reductions
based on Basel I. By the time mandated banks started their transition process after 2011, a
new Dodd-Frank provision mandated that the minimum capital requirement would be capped
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by what it would be under Basel I. While seven banks were approved to use the advanced
approaches in 2014, three of them are still under the transition process. SEC filings suggest
that the U.S. banks adopting Basel II do not expect a material impact. I therefore exclude the
U.S. domestic banks from my analysis and perform robustness checks.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
The central hypothesis is that in response to higher capital charges as a shock to loan retention,
speculative-grade borrowers become more likely to default. I derive this prediction from the
financial intermediation literature predicting that the reduction in loan shares distorts banks’
incentives to monitor (i.e., to minimize a borrower’s default risk). This literature argues
that a lender has incentives to monitor borrowers if it has adequate exposure to their default
(e.g., Hölmstrolm and Tirole, 1997). The exposure to default is in turn provided by keeping
loans on the balance sheets until maturity. Thus, banks have weaker incentives to screen and
monitor their borrowers if they sell the loans that they originate (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995).
Furthermore, researchers argue that shadow banks could weaken banks’ monitoring incentives
because they are uninformed and have weak incentives (Parlour and Plantin, 2008; and Billett
et. al., 2016). I therefore also predict that defaults will increase more for loans that are sold
to shadow banks, and in particular if the latter are uninformed or have little stakes.
The findings in this paper line up with the main argument of recent theories showing that
higher capital requirements could increase risk in the presence of shadow banks. For example,
Platin (2014) develops a model where banks circumvent capital regulation through shadow
banks. The difference between formal and shadow banks in their model is adverse selection.
Banks exploit shadow banks to offload their risky assets, but they cannot commit to not use
their private information about these assets. They predict that a rise in capital requirements
causes a surge in shadow banking activity at the cost of adverse selection. They also show
that if banks face excessive capital requirements, and if adverse selection costs do not matter,
banks increase risk and transfer it into shadow banks in a way that reduces welfare. Similarly,
Harris, Opp, and Opp (2014) develop a model in which bank capital regulation constrains
bank lending capacity, and shadow banks pick up the lack. They predict that competition
with shadow banks could lead banks to make risky loans to stay profitable.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy used to identify systematic changes in loan shares,
syndicate structure, and default risk around the risk-sensitive capital shock.
2.3.1 Loan Retention
First, I analyze systematic changes in loan contracts around the risk-sensitive capital shock.
Similar to Irani et. al. (2018), I hypothesize that higher capital charges lead banks to shrink
loan retention to reduce their risk-weighted assets and increase their regulatory capital ratios4.
Therefore, I predict a drop in lead shares for speculative-grade loans originated by affected
banks compared to unaffected banks. Identifying this effect is a challenge because capital
charges are not random. They increase in downturns due to higher estimates of default risk.
However, downturns might require banks to hold larger shares because fewer investors invest
in loan syndicates (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), while portfolio diversification constraints
promote loan sales. Thus, capital charges and loan shares suffer from endogeneity.
In the main identification strategy, I exploit the staggered implementation of risk-sensitive
capital regulation by the U.S. subsidiaries of non-U.S. banks to separate the impact of capital re-
quirements on loan shares from other spurious effects. The dependent variable is Loan shareijt,
which is a continuous variable that denotes the fraction that lead arranger commits to a facility.
I estimate the following regression specification:
Loan Shareijt = αj + αt + δ × eventjt + γ ×Xijt + ijt (1)
The dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period after bank j becomes
subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. The parameter of interest δ measures the causal
impact of risk-sensitive capital regulation on loan retention after relative to before the regula-
tion, controlling for observable and unobservable differences between banks and within-banks
over time. Thus, the identification compares the loan retention of the same lead bank after
it switches to risk-sensitive capital. If banks react to higher capital charges by reducing loan
retention, the coefficient δ will be strictly negative. The null hypothesis is that δ is zero, and
that regulatory capital charges are unimportant for loan retention (e.g., because banks can
4To increase regulatory capital, banks can either cut assets (i.e., reduce lending or shrink loan retention),
or raise capital (i.e., raise new equity or reduce dividends in favour of retained earnings).
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costlessly raise equity).
The unit of observation is the facility-loan level, arranged by lead bank j for firm i in period
t. The lead bank fixed effect αj controls for time-invariant bank characteristics such as size,
funding structure, or bank risk management, and it absorbs average loan retention in facilities
originated by lead bank j across all firms. Thus, it ensures that I capture changes in loan
retention for the same bank. The time fixed effect αt controls for time-specific trends, and Xijt
denote firm-level and bank-level controls provided by Dealscan at deal close — such as lender
state, borrower state, parent country of the borrower firm, parent country of the bank, two-digit
SIC borrower industry, and log(borrower sales). The state variables control for state-specific
credit conditions, and industry variables capture industry-specific investment opportunities.
When I include state-year and industry-year fixed effects to capture time-varying trends at the
industry and state level, the results are similar. Country fixed effects such as the bank’s parent
country absorb the average loan retention for banks headquartered in the same country. To
sharpen the analysis, I include deal purpose fixed effects for different deal categories such as
investment, LBO, M&A, working capital, and refinancing. Generating a bias in δ requires a
change unique to affected banks simultaneous with the shock that decreases loan shares for
speculative-grade firms in the same industry, in the same state, and for the same purpose.
One concern for interpreting δ is that risk-sensitive capital might affect banks in ways other
than capital charges. If banks experience a positive regulatory capital shock by the regulation,
they will be willing to lend more and increase loan retention. This would lead to a downward
bias in the estimation of δ. Additionally, if banks choose to diversify their loan portfolio in
response to risk-sensitive capital, the estimate of δ would be biased upwards, but I would also
observe a reduction in the shares for all loans. I therefore provide a placebo test by examining
the impact of risk-sensitive capital on loans with no speculative-grade credit ratings (i.e., for
which capital charges do not increase). Furthermore, the staggered setting mitigates such
concerns because potential biases are likely to cancel out in the cross-section.
To examine whether banks exploit shadow banks to reduce loan retention, I replace the
dependent variable with Migrateijt, that takes the value of one for deals that are originated
with a shadow bank. The empirical strategy is identical to the analysis regarding changes in
loan retention, except that I do the estimation at the loan-package level. I assume a linear
model and estimate the following regression specification:
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Migrateijt = αj + αt + δ × eventjt + γ ×Xijt + ijt (2)
I predict an increase in shadow bank participation, and that the coefficient δ is strictly
positive.
2.3.2 Default Risk
Data on ex post borrower default outcomes that I extract from Moody Default & Recovery
Database allows me to identify the impact of higher capital charges on default risk. Let the
dependent variable defaultijt take the value of one if firm i experiences default ex post at any
time within five years of taking out the loan. I estimate the following linear probability model
at loan-level:
Defaultijt = αj + αt + δ × eventjt + γ ×Xijt + ijt (3)
The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to risk-sensitive capital
regulation and zero otherwise. A reduction in loan shares should reduce the incentives of lead
banks to monitor. If lead banks monitor less, I expect borrowers to become more likely to
default. The parameter of interest δ measures the impact of the regulation on the probability
of ex post default after relative to before the regulation, controlling for observables at the time
of loan origination. A negative impact of the regulation on monitoring predicts a positive
value of δ. The ex post borrower performance proxies for ex ante loan riskiness, which is
unobservable5. In subsequent analysis, I attempt to disentangle ex ante screening from ex post
monitoring. In terms of the former, I saturate Equation 3 by exploiting the asymmetry of
information and incentives between different parties involved in syndication to understand the
mechanism behind changes in default risk, and risk-sharing with shadow banks.
2.4 Data
I obtain my sample of speculative-grade leveraged loans from the Reuters Loan Pricing Cor-
poration’s (LPC) Dealscan database between 1997 and 2017. I consider a loan to be a
5Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina (2012) investigate whether securitization is associated with risky lending
by examining the performance of individual loans held by collateralized loan obligations.
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"speculative-grade leveraged loan" if it has an S&P credit rating of BB+ or lower. This
definition follows the Dealscan classification, and it is consistent with prior literature (Lim,
Minton, and Weisbach, 2014; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012; and Wang and Xia, 2014). My
sample consists of dollar-denominated, and senior secured loans with floating interest-rate pay-
ments, made to non-financial U.S. public firms, and completed between 1997 and 2017 . Each
observation corresponds to a specific loan facility – which I collapse to package-level to iden-
tify aggregate loan amount, syndicate structure (e.g., number of lenders and shadow bank
presence), and borrower performance. I use facility-level data when the dependent variable is
allindrawn because different facilities are associated with different interest rates – and bank
allocation – that corresponds to the amount that lead lenders commit to a given facility. Con-
sistent with the literature, I additionally restrict my sample to the most common loan types
(i.e., Revolver, Revolver/Line, 364-Day Facility, Limited Line, Demand Loan or a term loan).
My primary focus is on the nexus of capital regulation and shadow banks, for which I use two
alternative definitions based on (a) lender type (which I further classify by lender role), and (b)
loan type. In terms of the former, I follow prior empirical work (see Lim, Minton, and Weisbach
(2014), among others). I classify a lender as shadow bank if the lender is listed by Dealscan
as neither a commercial or investment bank. Non-bank lenders include hedge funds, private
equity funds, mutual funds, pension funds and endowments, distressed funds, collateralized
loan obligations (CLOs), insurance companies, and finance companies. To identify commercial
bank lenders, I include lenders whose type in Dealscan is designated as US Bank, African Bank,
Asian-Pacific Bank, Foreign Bank, Eastern Europe/Russian Bank, Middle-Eastern Bank, or
Thrift/S&L. Investment bank lenders are directly called as Investment Banks by Dealscan.
Using this classification, I define two dummy variables: lead non-bank and tranche non-bank.
The former takes a value of one if the loan syndicate has a non-bank lead arranger, and the
latter takes one if the loan syndicate has a non-bank participant. To identify lead arrangers,
I follow Standard & Poor’s (2006) and LSTA (2006) definitions. I classify a lender as a lead
arranger if it is assigned one of the following titles: administrative agent, agent, arranger,
bookrunner, lead arranger, lead bank, or lead manager. Finally, I define a third non-bank
variable based on loan type and call it an institutional loan. Institutional loan takes a value
of one either if the original syndicate has a non-bank, or the loan has a Term Loan B (TLB).
I extract firm-level variables from Compustat. To do so, I match borrower’s and/or bor-
rower’s parent name (borrowercompany) in Dealscan to Compustat (gvkey) and Execucomp
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(gvkey) by using the Dealscan and Compustat link file provided by Michael Roberts. Next,
I manually match Dealscan to the Moody & Default Recovery Database by the borrower’s
and/or borrower’s parent name in Dealscan (borrowercompany) to the name of the issuer in
Moody’s (issuer nam). Appendix A.1 descriptive statistics and Appendix A.2 provides variable
definitions.
3 Results
3.1 Loan Sales and Migration
In this section, I investigate the impact of risk-sensitive capital regulation on loan retention,
syndicate structure, and shadow bank presence.
3.1.1 Validation of the Empirical Setting
First, I validate the empirical setting by investigating the impact of the risk-sensitive capital
regulation on the extensive margin of bank lending. If banks face higher capital charges
for speculative-grade loans, they will have fewer incentives to originate such loans to lower
their risk-weighted assets. This yields the following prediction: Banks subject to risk-sensitive
capital become less likely to arrange deals for speculative-grade firms and lose market share in
the leveraged loan market.
Table 2 presents the results on the extensive margin of lending. Specifically, I investigate
the impact of risk-sensitive capital on the probability of originating a speculative-grade loan.
In Column 1 to 2, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the lender is
lead arranger within the syndicate, and zero otherwise. For this test, I use facility-lender level
data, include one observation for each lender in a given facility, and include loan fixed effects.
The identification design is similar in spirit to Khwaja and Mian (2008). Given that firms in
the syndicated loan market typically borrow from multiple banks, I compare the probability of
being a lead arranger to a firm between banks within a given syndicate at any given point in
time. I find that the probability of being a lead arranger in a speculative-grade deal is 10.05
percentage points lower after the risk-sensitive capital regulation for affected banks relative to
other banks (Column 1). However, I find no such change in the likelihood of assuming the lead
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arranger role for loans with no speculative-grade credit ratings (Column 2). This is consistent
with speculative-grade loans bearing higher capital charges.
[Table 2 here]
In Column 3, I collapse deal-level data to monthly bank level, and compute the share of
the number of speculative-grade deals originated by a lender in a month to the total number
of speculative-grade deals originated over the same time period. I find that banks subject
to the risk-sensitive capital regulation lose 1.33 percentage points market share per month
as lead arrangers in the speculative-grade loan market relative to other banks. This result
is economically meaningful since the average monthly market share is around 5%. I find no
change in the market share for deals with no speculative-grade credit ratings (Column 4). This
result confirms that after the regulation, speculative-grade loans bear higher capital charges.
3.1.2 Loan Sales
Although lead banks could originate speculative-grade loans to collect fees and sell them, they
typically retain a portion on their balance sheets. They do this to signal loan quality to other
market participants and increase liquidity. Furthermore, although banks typically originate
and distribute term loans to non-banks in the secondary loan market, the little depth in the
secondary market for credit lines requires them to hold the latter on their balance sheet (Bord
and Santos, 2012). Hence, becoming a lead arranger requires some balance sheet exposure
during the course of the loan. Thus, I predict the following. Conditional on originating a
speculative-grade loan, banks subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation reduce loan retention.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 estimates Equation 1 and reports the results on the intensive margin of lending
to speculative-grade borrowers. In Column 1, I show that after risk-sensitive capital, lead
banks reduce their shares in speculative-grade facilities 7.04 percentage points6 (Column 1).
However, I find no such change in the lead shares in loan facilities with no speculative-grade
6Using the Shared National Credit database (a supervisory credit register administered by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency), Bord and Santos (2012) investigate the time-series evolution of the individual
15
ratings (Column 2). These results are consistent with speculative-grade loans bearing higher
capital charges, and suggest that banks shrink loan retention in loans with higher capital
requirements. This is consistent with Irani et. al. (2018), who also find that low-capital
banks shrink loan retention through loan sales in the secondary loan markets to improve their
regulatory capital position.
To understand what drives the lead share drop in speculative-grade loans, I investigate
whether lead arrangers form more diffuse syndicates, and distribute loans to shadow banks.
In Column 2, I replace the dependent variable in Equation 3 with the natural logarithm of
total number of lenders in loan syndicates. The total number of syndicate participants in
speculative-grade loans is 24.21% higher when lead bank becomes subject to the risk-sensitive
capital regulation. This suggests that banks form more diffuse syndicates – sell the loans that
they originate to a greater number of participants – to keep smaller portions of them. Next, I
test whether higher capital charges lead to a migration of credit origination to shadow banks.
In Column 3, I estimate Equation 2 and investigate the probability that the loan has a non-
bank lead arranger. I find that lead banks 11.36 percentage points more likely to co-originate
loans with non-bank institutional investors after the risk-sensitive capital regulation.
In addition to loan retention, the increase in capital charges might also affect the maturity
and price of lending (the interest rate charged on loans). I report these tests in Table 4. While
capital charges for loans under the standardized approach are automatically assigned at loan
origination and do not change, capital charges for loans under IRB are continuously updated
based on internal credit risk estimates, implying an increase in capital charges in economic
downturns. Berger and Udell (1988) argue that banks shorten debt maturity to renegotiate
loan terms more frequently. As most international foreign banks active in the syndicated loan
markets adopted the IRB approach, they might find the option to frequently renegotiate loan
terms more valuable. Thus, I expect that banks subject to risk-sensitive capital might shorten
debt maturity to be able to renegotiate more frequently. In line with this conjecture, the
result in Table 4, Column 1 shows that after the regulation, lead banks shorten debt maturity
share of each credit that lead banks originate and retain on their balance sheets in the syndicated loan markets.
They find that in the years after origination, lead arrangers tend to increasingly reduce their aggregate exposure
to the loans that they originate. The estimates in Table 2 reflect the impact of risk-sensitive capital on lead
shares at loan origination; therefore, they are likely to be a lower bound on the reduction in loan retention.
As Dealscan only provides loan-level data at loan origination, and as I have no access to the SNC database, I
cannot verify this conjecture.
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by 10.34% (which roughly corresponds to six months on average). The decrease in maturity
is concentrated to bank tranches (Column 2), and the change in the maturity of non-bank
tranches is negative but statistically insignificant (Column 3).
[Table 4 here]
In Column 4, I replace the dependent variable by allindrawn, which corresponds to the
interest rate that borrowers pay in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down,
including the fees. The coefficient is positive, indicating that, relatively, interest rates increase,
but the effect is very small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that banks respond
to the risk-sensitive capital regulation by reducing loan retention and loan maturity, instead
of increasing interest rates. This result is consistent with the prior literature that found that
banks react to higher capital charges by reducing loan quantities instead of increasing interest
rates (Behn, Haselmann, and Wachtel, 2016; and Fraisse, Lé and Thesmar, 2017).
To sharpen the evidence that risk-sensitive capital leads to reduced loan retention among
speculative-grade loans with higher capital charges, I depict the average loan share of lead
banks in speculative-grade facilities around risk-sensitive capital in Figure 4. I observe a sharp
drop in the lead share of treated banks subsequent to regulation on average from 27 to 16%. In
addition, I find no evidence of pre-trends. Figure 5 depicts the kernel density plots showing the
loan share of lead banks in speculative-grade facilities before risk-sensitive capital (grey line)
and after risk-sensitive capital (black line). There is a clear leftward shift in the distribution
of lead shares after the regulation. This graphical evidence suggests that the regulation is
negatively correlated with lead share in speculative-grade loans, and that the results in Table 3
are not driven by outliers.
[Figure 4 here]
[Figure 5 here]
Similarly, I plot the dynamics of the probability of having a non-bank lead arranger in
speculative-grade loans around risk-sensitive capital in Figure 6. I observe a sharp rise in the




In this section, I study whether in response to higher capital charges as an exogenous shock
to loan retention, banks have weaker monitoring incentives and originate riskier loans. Thus,
I hypothesize that borrowers subject to higher capital charges default systematically more ex
post after the regulation. The reasoning for defining monitoring incentives based on lead shares
is the idea that the wealth effects of credit risk are ultimately born by lead banks in proportion
to their percentage ownership (i.e., loan shares). Thus, loan sales reduce the incentives of
banks to conduct credit analysis and monitor borrowers (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995).
I define defaultijt as a dummy variable that takes one if firm i defaults at any time within
five years of taking out the loan. I define bankruptijt as a variable that is one if the borrower
goes bankrupt at any time within five years of taking out a loan. Figure 7 displays the
average market-adjusted probability of ex post borrower default outcomes for speculative-grade
contracts originated by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that become subject to the risk-
sensitive capital regulation7. Before the regulation, borrower performance is similar to that
of other borrowers in the syndicated loan market. However, after the regulation, there is a
significant increase in ex post borrower default outcomes for speculative-grade loans originated
by treated banks, compared to all other loans in the syndicated loan market.
[Figure 7 here]
Table 5 displays the results from estimating the linear probability model in Equation 3.
The first two columns include all loans given to the speculative-grade public firms in Dealscan.
Speculative-grade loans originated by affected banks are 8.28 percentage points more likely to
be followed by ex post borrower default after the risk-sensitive capital regulation, relative to
other loans (Column 1). Replacing the defaultijt dependent variable with bankruptijt slightly
reduces the effect to 7.24 percentage points (Column 2). Consistent with no increase in capital
charges being associated with no monitoring distortions, there is no increase in ex post borrower
7To calculate the market-adjusted probability of ex post borrower default outcomes, I de-mean the ex post
borrower default variable with the average ex post borrower default probability in the syndicated loan market.
To compute the % of default outcomes on the y-axis, I align contracts around the year of risk-sensitive capital
regulation and calculate the average ex post borrower default for all contracts within the same distance to the
regulation. Because the regulation is staggered, there are lesser performance data points available for banks
that are subsequently affected. For that reason I compute cumulative annual averages within the same distance
to the event.
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defaults for the sub-sample of loans extended to non-speculative grade public firms. Instead,
non-speculative-grade borrowers of affected banks default systematically less ex post (Column
3), and go bankrupt systematically less ex post (Column 4). There is no change in default
probability for the entire sample. Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that higher
capital charges map to higher credit risk. This is consistent with the hypothesis that in response
to a negative shock to loan retention, banks have fewer incentives to monitor default risk.
[Table 5 here]
I re-estimate Equation 3 with alternative default windows, and report the results in Figure 8.
I find that the increase in default risk essentially appears in the long-run — essentially after
four years of loan origination.
[Figure 8 here]
Next, I analyze the mechanism through which default risk rises under the new rules. Default
risk might rise because borrowers are not properly screened ex ante, but also because of lax
monitoring ex post. In the next two sections, I attempt to disentangle ex ante screening from ex
post monitoring. In Section 3.3, I investigate changes in borrower characteristics, and exploit
the asymmetry of information and incentives between lenders at loan origination as evidence of
lax screening. To test whether banks monitor less ex post, I analyze the strictness of covenants
(Section 3.4.1), and I examine borrowers’ characteristics after loan origination (Section 3.4.2).
3.3 Does default risk rise due to lax screening ex ante?
3.3.1 Riskiness at loan origination
I first test for lax screening and look at borrower characteristics at loan origination. I show that
the borrowers of affected banks are more indebted and observably riskier. I use Equation 3,
and I replace the dependent variable with the debt to assets ratio of the borrower one year prior
to loan origination. I also saturate Equation 3 with industry-year and state-year fixed effects.
In doing so, I take into account the unobservable economic trends that could differentially
correlate with borrower characteristics of banks subject to the regulation. The result is shown
19
in Table 6. I show that the debt to assets of borrowers of affected banks increases by 4.37
percentage points. Thus, banks subject to the regulation lend to borrowers that become
observably riskier.
[Table 6 here]
Next, I look at the impact of the regulation on ex post defaults, taking into account time
trends in industry, state, and size, as well as observable contract characteristics (such as loan
amount, loan maturity, and interest rate) and ex ante borrower indebtedness. The results are
collected in Table 7. When I include industry-year, size-year and state-year fixed effects, the
estimate becomes somewhat larger at 9.14 (Column 4). It is still positive and significant at
a 1% significance level. In Column 5, I control for observable contract characteristics (such
as loan amount, loan maturity, and interest rate) and borrower indebtedness. The estimate
becomes only slightly smaller than in Table 5. Hence, there is an increase in ex post default
risk, even after controlling for unobservable economic trends, observable loan characteristics,
or higher borrower indebtedness at loan origination.
[Table 7 here]
3.3.2 Screening Effort
In this section, I exploit the cross-sectional variation in lead bank’s incentives and information
to obtain further insights about the underlying source of higher defaults after the regulation.
The central concern is moral hazard, because loan sales weaken banks’ monitoring incentives.
In particular, I attempt to understand whether lead banks become less likely to collect soft
information, or whether they originate riskier loans because they have less exposure to default.
I hypothesize that defaults will be higher for loans in which lead banks retain very little stakes
or those that require them to collect more information.
In Table 8 (Column 1), I interact the right-hand side eventjt variable with the dummy
variable low lead shareijt that indicates whether the lead bank j retains less than 5% stake in
loan ijt. I find that speculative-grade loans where the lead bank retains less than 5% are 26.06
percentage more likely to experience borrower defaults compared to other speculative-grade
deals under the new rules. This strengthens the evidence in Section 3.1 that there is a moral
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hazard problem because lead banks that retain a smaller portion of speculative-grade loans
have weaker monitoring incentives.
[Table 8 here]
Lenders must exert an unobservable effort to collect soft information, and lower exposure
to default reduces their effort incentives. If the regulation results in weaker screening effort,
defaults should be higher for loans in which lead banks know very little about ex ante borrower
quality. In Table 8 (Column 1), I interact the right-hand side eventjt variable with the dummy
prior lending relationijt that indicates whether the lead bank j has a prior lending relation
with borrower i before the regulation. I find that these loans are 5.38 percentage points higher
among borrowers with prior lending relations to lead banks. This finding does not support
the screening hypothesis, but instead suggests that lead banks are ex ante informed about the
riskiness of the borrowers. In Column 2-4, I show that loans with lead banks with low lending
expertise in the syndicated loan markets (Column 1), low industry specialization (Column 2),
and low private information on borrowers (Column 3) are significantly less likely to exhibit
defaults. Thus, I find no evidence that lead banks exert less screening effort but instead show
that banks originate riskier loans because they have less exposure to default.
3.3.3 Adverse Selection vis-à-vis Shadow Banks
The banking literature argues that banks have a comparative information advantage relative
to other lenders based on two ideas. First, banks build up experience and specialization in
monitoring borrowers through time (Fama, 1985). Second, banks form repeated interactions
with their borrowers and accumulate firm-specific and private information such as detailed
knowledge of their borrowers’ assets and investment opportunities (Boot, 2000). Due to less
lending and monitoring experience, and shorter longevity of lending relationships, shadow
banks are less likely to know about the true quality of the loans. Second, shadow banks likely
lack the proper incentives to screen and monitor because of their little stakes. Thus, I predict
that the rise in defaults should be greater among the loans distributed to shadow banks who
have less ability and incentives to monitor credit quality.
To test this hypothesis, I modify Equation 3 in Table 9 by interacting the right-hand side
variable eventijt with dummies that define a pecking order of non-bank participation where
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higher non-bank participation means that non-banks are more likely to distort monitoring. In
Column 1, I interact eventijt with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if loanijt has a
non-bank lead arranger (i.e., co-originated with non-bank institutional investors). I find that
the relative increase in ex post borrower defaults after the risk-sensitive capital regulation is
7.13 percentage points higher for loans that have a non-bank lead arranger (monitor). This
is consistent with the view that non-banks are less likely to monitor borrowers. In Column
2, I find that the wedge in default probability is 5.8 percentage points higher for loans with
a non-bank participant at loan origination, and also sold to non-banks in the secondary loan
markets. I also show that the increase in defaults is 5.74 percentage points higher for loans
with a non-bank participant (Column 3), and 2.91 percentage points greater for loans that are
sold to non-banks in the secondary loan markets (Column 4). In contrast, the relative increase
in default probability is 5.55 percentage points less for contracts with only bank participation
(Column 5). In Columns 6 to 10, I replace the dependent variable with defaultijt and obtain
similar results. The wedge is highest for loans with a non-bank monitor (Column 6), and
negative for loans with only bank participation (Column 10). Taken together, these results are
consistent with monitoring distortions, and reveal a pecking order of default risk where the
latter is highest when non-banks have a monitoring role (i.e., they are lead arrangers).
[Table 9 here]
The rise in default risk could be higher among loans distributed to shadow banks because
the latter are less able to know the true quality of loans (information channel), but also because
they lack the proper incentives to screen and monitor (incentive channel). If shadow banks
free-ride on lead bank’s information collection and they do not control credit quality, they are
less likely to require the lead bank to monitor. I therefore exploit the cross-sectional variation
in shadow banks’ information and incentives to obtain further insights about the underlying
source of lax screening. I predict the following. The rise in defaults after the regulation is
higher among loans distributed to non-banks with low monitoring ability and/or incentives.
In Table 10, Column 1–4, I test the degree of asymmetric information among non-bank
participants. In Column 1, I hypothesize that non-bank subsidiaries of banks likely benefit
from the private information of their bank parents, and that they are more informed relative
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to non-bank lenders that have no bank affiliations8. To account for bank affiliation as a
source of in information asymmetry, I modify Specification 3 by interacting the right-hand side
eventjt variable with a no bank affiliationijt dummy that indicates whether loan ijt has non-
bank participants that are not owned or controlled by banks (i.e., with a parent or ultimate
parent that is not classified as a commercial or investment bank by Dealscan). Consistent with
the view that a bank parent should improve monitoring, I find that for loans with non-bank
participants who are not affiliated with banks, the relative wedge in the probability of default
after the regulation is 11.96 percentage points larger.
[Table 10 here]
In Column 2, I exploit non-bank experience in syndicated loan markets as a source of asym-
metric information among non-bank participants. If non-banks have lending expertise, they
should better assess borrower credit quality. To address this channel, I interact eventjt with
the dummy variable low lending expertiseijt that takes one if the average lending experience of
non-banks at loan origination is less than five years. I find that the relative increase in defaults
is 15.01 percentage points greater for loans with less experienced non-bank participants. In
Column 3, I consider non-banks’ industry specialization, as participants with expertise in the
borrower’s industry are likely to better assess the credit quality of their borrowers (Ivashina,
2009). To test this channel, I interact eventjt with low industry expertiseijt that has the value
of one if the average industry-specific lending experience of non-banks is less than five years.
I show that the relative increase in defaults is 16.04 percentage points greater for loans with
non-banks with low industry-specific expertise.
According to Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), and Ivashina (2009),
repeated lending reduces information asymmetry about the borrower. Thus, in Column 4, I
interact eventjt with the dummy variable short relation with borrowerijt that takes the value
of one if the average length of lending relation with borrower i of non-bank participants is less
than five years. Similarly, the wedge in default probability is 7.86 percentage points higher for
the loans with less informed non-banks. Taken together, these results are consistent with the
8For example, a CLO has an underwriter (typically a bank) responsible for screening the loan portfolio,
and rating and pricing the CLO tranches (Benmelech Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012). For this type of non-bank
institutional investors, banks exert direct influence on screening.
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hypothesis that information asymmetry is the key channel for which the increase in default
probability is higher among the loans distributed to non-banks.
In Column 5, I test the incentive channel. To do so, I compare differences in ex post
borrower defaults for the deals where non-banks on average keep less than 5% with other loans
and I find no statistically significant difference. This suggests that the incentive channel is not
borne out in the data. Thus, when a lead bank shrinks loan retention, non-banks with lesser
expertise and information – and not fewer incentives – bear higher credit risk among loans
originated by the same bank.
The syndicated loan market is a private market and the choice of participants is largely
determined by the lead bank (Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2009). Thus, there could be
a tacit market segmentation that causes banks subject to the rules to strategically sell higher
quality loans to other banks and to non-banks with established presence, and distribute riskier
loans to lenders that are new entrants, lack industry specialization, or private information9.
However, uninformed non-banks might internalize adverse selection by submitting bids that
are insensitive to credit quality regardless of whether banks strategically target them to dis-
tribute lower-quality loans. Due to lack of data on the (pre-) syndication process, I cannot
yet distinguish between these two explanations. Thus, the paper is agnostic about the exact
mechanism through which lead banks distribute risky loans to uninformed shadow banks.
The interpretation of Table 10 is that uninformed non-banks internalize adverse selection
more because they had less ability to check credit quality. However, one concern is that
the latter might willingly accept risk in a search-for-yield. To test whether uninformed non-
banks are compensated for internalizing higher credit risk, I augment Table 12 by adding the
allindrawnijt, variable – which corresponds to the initial amount that borrower i pays in basis
points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, including the fees. In Column 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, I
find no evidence that uninformed non-banks who bear higher credit risk are compensated with
a higher interest rate at loan origination10. This strengthens the evidence that non-banks bear
higher credit risk because they have no adequate technology to check credit quality. Thus,
their pricing schedule does not demonstrate sensitivity to the increase in credit risk.
9In general, litigation between syndicate members is rare because: (a) syndicate loans are not regulated by
the Security Act of 1933 and (b) loan agreements typically limit the lead arranger’s liability (Ivashina 2009).
10This finding is supportive of the link between non-bank institutional demand and credit mispricing in the
leveraged loan markets (Ivashina and Sun, 2011).
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[Table 11 here]
This analysis is inconclusive on the efficiency of trades from the perspective of uninformed
shadow banks. It is possible that the latter sell their stakes at a premium in the secondary
loan markets, and they do not make a loss. Answering this question requires the knowledge
of trades and expected returns for each syndicate participant. However, no dataset that I am
aware of contains this information. In the Appendix, I investigate potential explanations and I
report evidence of learning on behalf of shadow banks. I show that banks with high historical
defaults become less likely to distribute loans to shadow banks in the secondary loan markets
(Table B2). This suggests that while risky loans are originated through uninformed shadow
banks, adverse selection is broadly internalized in the secondary loan markets — reducing
subsequent liquidity. While I do not find that shadow banks invest in risky loans for motives
such as access to other businesses (Table B3), I cannot rule out the possibility that they
willingly internalize adverse selection to gain market share in syndicated lending.
Finally, I investigate whether there is evidence of adverse selection vis-à-vis bank partici-
pants. Put differently, I examine whether loans extended to less informed bank participants
exhibit more defaults after the regulation. The results are reported in Table 12. I find that for
loans with bank participants with low lending expertise in syndicated lending (Column 1), low
industry specialization (Column 2), low private information on borrowers (Column 3), and low
incentives (Column 4), the difference in default probability is not statistically significant. This
shows that the information and incentive channel shut down for banks. It also suggests that
shadow banks bear higher credit risk because they have no adequate monitoring technology.
[Table 12 here]
3.4 Does default risk rise due to lax monitoring ex post?
In this section, I investigate whether defaults rise because banks monitor less ex post. To this
end, I take two steps. First, I analyse whether loans originated under the risk-sensitive capital
regulation are associated with laxer covenants. Second, I test whether borrowers engage in
risky behavior after loan origination because banks monitor less.
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3.4.1 Covenant Analysis
In this section, I study whether defaults in non-bank loans subject to the risk-sensitive capital
regulation rise because banks monitor less ex post. This could happen because debt ownership
becomes more dispersed and makes renegotiation more difficult. To test for this, I analyse the
existence and strictness of loan covenants.
Prior literature argues that banks monitor borrowers by designing restrictive covenants
(e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979; and Rajan and Winton 1995). Covenants are used to protect,
and signal the ability of borrowers to pay back their debt. They operate through two mech-
anisms: limit the control rights of the management (for example by preventing the firm from
undertaking risky and opportunistic behaviour in terms of equity distributions, additional debt,
or new acquisitions), and give banks the right to renegotiate the debt contracts ex post (for
example by imposing default or stricter contractual terms or accelerating payments11) in the
event of a violation. There is empirical evidence that covenants reduce the cost of debt capital
ex ante (Reisel, 2014; and Bradley and Roberts, 2015); and create shareholder value ex post
(Chava and Roberts, 2008; and Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009, 2012). Thus, I test the following:
If banks subject to risk-sensitive capital monitor less, they will impose looser covenants.
Detailed description of loan covenants in Dealscan allows me to exploit different measures
of monitoring. The results are collected in Table 13. I find that banks subject to risk-sensitive
capital experience a 16.73% decrease in the number of covenants in loans co-originated with
non-banks (Column 1), and 28.82% drop in loans distributed to non-banks in the secondary
loan markets (Column 2). To understand what type of covenants is removed, I further classify
them into three groups (debt covenant, investment covenant, and value covenant). On the
extensive margin, the regulation is only associated with a removal of debt covenants — (that
limit the firm’s indebtedness). Speculative-grade loans subject to higher capital charges and
co-originated with non-banks are 22.12 percentage points less likely to have a debt covenant
(Column 3), and speculative-grade contracts subject to higher capital charges and distributed
to non-banks in the secondary loan markets are 18.43 percentage points less likely to have
a debt covenant (Column 4). I observe no differences in the probability of having a value
covenant — (that requires the firm to keep up with minimum profitability and net worth value
requirements), or an investment covenant (Column 5-8). The probability of having a dividend
11See, for example, Roberts and Sufi, 2009.
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restriction, however, goes down, with 5.69 percentage points drop for loans co-originated with
non-banks (Column 9) and 21.04 percentage points reduction for non-bank term loans (Column
10).
[Table 13 here]
Next, I examine covenant strictness and enforcement. In terms of covenant strictness, I
use the Murfin (2012) covenant strictness measure — which measures the probability that
a borrower may violate its covenants, considering the correlation and interaction of various
covenants in the contract. Using the Murfin measure, I show that after the risk-sensitive
capital regulation, banks relax covenant strictness by 4.86% for speculative-grade loans co-
originated with non-banks (Column 11), and by 5.45% for speculative-grade loans with a
non-bank term tranche (Column 12). This estimate is close to that reported by Wang and Xia
(2014), who have documented that covenant strictness decreases by 8.4% when a lender switches
from non-securitization active to securitization active. Finally, I find that non-bank loans are
substantially more likely to be cov-lite12; thus, they have weaker covenant enforcement. The
probability of being cov-lite increases by 4.03 percentage points for loans with a non-bank lead
(Column 13), and 36.69 percentage points for loans with a non-bank term tranche.
Hence, banks subject to risk-sensitive capital monitor less after loan origination: they relax
covenants limiting borrowers’ indebtedness. As shown in Table 6, the looser covenants in
speculative-grade loans subject to risk-sensitive capital do not merely reflect ex ante lower
credit risk. Instead, initial leverage ratios are higher.
3.4.2 Firm-Level Analysis
In this section, I investigate whether borrowers behave opportunistically and engage in risky
behavior after loan origination because banks subject to the regulation monitor less. To un-
derstand changes in firm-level outcomes after loan origination, I run the following regression
specification13:
12The definition taken from Ivashina and Sun (2017) states that a cov-lite (i.e., a contract with incurrence
provisions) requires the firm to comply with financial covenants only in the case of an active event — such as
issuance of additional financing, sale of assets, or merger. For example, a cov-heavy contract requires the firm
to comply with a leverage cap at all points in time, while a cov-lite contract is enforced when the firm raises
additional financing.
13The sample is limited to firms which appear in Dealscan database at least once, and for which Compustat
data are available.
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yit = αi + αt + β ∗ Afterit + γ ∗Xit + it (4)
where yit is replaced with firm-level outcomes. The dummy variable Afterit is one from
the year when firm i with a speculative-grade credit rating takes out a loan from a bank that
is subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. The results are reported in Table 14. I find that
while debt contracts originated by affected banks are followed by a rise in total debt (Column 1,
Panel A); they are associated with no significant changes in firms’ investment (Panel B, Column
1). Instead, I observe that after loan origination, firms improve their liquidity position, and
increase their cash holdings by 17.52% (Column 2, Panel B). I observe no significant changes
in net working capital (Column 3, Panel B), employment (Column 4, Panel B) and in the
fraction of profits that firms pay to shareholders (Column 5, Panel B). Thus, the increase in
firms’ leverage leads to a rise in cash ratio, rather than an increase in capital expenditures.
[Table 14 here]
I further examine changes in firms’ leverage and profitability. After borrowing from a bank
affected by risk-sensitive capital, firms’ debt to assets ratio increases by 6.93 percentage points
(Column 1, Panel A); net debt to assets ratio increases by 7.44 percentage points (Column 2,
Panel A); and long-term debt to assets ratio increases by 7.17 percentage points (Column 3,
Panel A). Specifically, firms increase debt maturity after borrowing from affected banks: while
there is no significant change in the amount of long-term debt due in the first year (Column 4,
Panel A), the amount of long-term debt maturing in the second-year, third-year, fourth-year
and fifth year rises by 19.76% (Column 5, Panel A), 35.19% (Column 6, Panel A), 53.57%
(Column 6, Panel A), 59.93% (Column 7, Panel A), respectively. Moreover, after taking out
a loan from an affected bank, firms’ profitability decreases by 2.68 percentage points (Column
6, Panel B). I also observe 13.80% drop in market value (Column 7, Panel B) and 15.73%
decrease in the stock price (Column 8, Panel B).
Hence, I find no evidence of moral hazard on behalf of the borrowers. This strengthens the
evidence that the increase in default risk is due to lax screening ex ante, as opposed to lax
monitoring ex post. In untabulated regressions, I confirm that the increase in ex post defaults
under the new regulation are systematically and negatively linked to ex ante investment op-
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portunities. This strengthens the evidence that firm-level outcomes are driven by ex ante firm
quality, as opposed to ex post moral hazard on behalf of the borrowers.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the risk implications of bank capital requirements in the presence of
shadow banks. I show that in response to higher capital charges as an exogenous shock to
loan retention, banks originate riskier loans, and transfer them to shadow banks. Under the
risk-sensitive capital rules, speculative-grade borrowers default systematically more ex post –
with this effect being confined to non-bank loans. Consistent with strategic adverse selection,
defaults are higher for loans that are distributed to uninformed non-banks, and on which lead
banks have more private information. Although banks relax covenants and monitor less ex
post, I do not find evidence of ex post moral hazard on behalf of the borrowers. After loan
origination, borrowers increase debt maturity and pile cash.
These results show that in the originate-to-distribute system, bank capital regulation dis-
torts screening incentives. Prior empirical work has shown that banks in the traditional
originate-to-hold model react to higher capital charges by lending less (Behn, Haselmann,
and Wachtel 2015). I find that in the originate-to-distribute system, banks sell the loans that
they originate, and that they, as a result, have weaker incentives to screen the riskiness of
their borrowers. The riskier loans are absorbed by shadow banks. These results are consistent
with recent models that argue that in the presence of shadow banks, bank capital requirements
could backfire (see, e.g., Plantin 2014). The amount of risk that is originated by banks, and
distributed to shadow banks is larger. To the extent that shadow banks are interconnected
with banks, the risk that is transferred to shadow banks might stay within the banking system.
While the purpose of banking regulations is to ensure the safety of financial system, they
will backfire if they distort banks’ monitoring. I therefore argue that bank regulations should
not be studied in isolation from incentives. One potential regulatory response is to complement
bank capital reforms with rules that align incentives within and across distinct players in the
economy. For example, regulators could target the compensation structure in banks, and link
bankers’ long-term pay to the long-term health of their borrowers and their reputation vis-à-
vis unsophisticated market participants. Another option is to impose minimum loan retention
requirements on the banks to ensure adequate monitoring incentives. Finally, the results in
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this paper suggest a positive link between bank capital regulation and financial crises in the
presence of regulatory arbitrage. This is an important area for future research.
Table 1: Countries affected by risk-sensitive capital
Event Year Affected Countries
2004 Canada, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Malaysia
2005 EU, New Zealand, India, Hong Kong, Colombia,
Pakistan, Qatar, Kuwait, Gibraltar, Mongolia
2006 Costa Rica, Philippines, Morocco, Oman, Sri Lanka
2007 Japan, South Korea, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Singapore,
Taiwan, Israel, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon
2008 Armenia, Bermuda, Jordan, UAE, Mauritius,
South Africa, Mexico, Croatia, Montenegro, Nepal
2009 China, Brunei, Russia, Serbia, Peru, Maldives
2010 Cayman Islands, Namibia
2011 Indonesia
2012 Egypt, Turkey, Macedonia, Uruguay




Table 2: Validation of the Empirical Setting
Extensive Margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Lead arrangerijt Bankmarket sharejt
Speculative Non-speculative Speculative Non-speculative
eventjt -0.1005*** -0.0133 -0.0133*** -0.0004
(0.0229) (0.0280) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Observations 34678 43648 5921 10511
R-squared 0.438 0.541 0.658 0.585
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Loan FE Yes Yes No No
Lender FE No No Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Loan Loan Lender Lender
This table reports results concerning the extensive margin of bank lending. In Column 1 and 3, the sample
is reduced to speculative-grade loans, and in Column 2 and 4, it is restricted to loans other than those with
speculative-grade ratings. The dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period after bank j becomes
subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. In Columns 1–2, the unit of observation is facility level, there is
one observation per lender-facility pair, and the dependent variable lead arrangerijt is a dummy that equals
one if lender receives lead arranger credit in the syndicate based on Reuters LPC’s League Table guidelines.
In Column 1, I test whether bank j becomes less likely to take lead arranger status within a syndicate after
it becomes subject to the regulation. In Column 2, test whether bank j becomes less likely to take lead
arranger status in a non-speculative-grade loan syndicate after the regulation. Controls include the state of the
lender j, and the parent country of the lender j. Standard errors correct for clustering at the package-level,
and are reported in parentheses. In Column 3-6, the unit of observation is collapsed to monthly-bank level.
The dependent variable bank market sharejt in Column 3 is the ratio of the number of speculative-grade loans
originated by bank j at time t divided by the total number of speculative-grade loans originated at time t.
In Column 4, the dependent variable bank market sharejt is the ratio of the number of non-speculative-grade
loans originated by bank j at time t divided by the total number of non-speculative-grade loans originated at
time t. Controls include the state and parent country of lender j. Standard errors correct for clustering at the
lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects,
and the level of clustering.***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2017).
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Table 3: Risk-sensitive capital and originate-to-distribute
Intensive Margin (1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: lead shareijt log(# total lenders)ijt non-bank leadijt
eventjt -7.0416** 0.2421*** 0.1136***
(3.5114) (0.0325) (0.0247)
Observations 2440 6231 6231
R-squared 0.491 0.773 0.384
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender
This table reports results concerning the intensive margin of bank lending using Equation 1 and 2. The
sample is reduced to speculative-grade loans. The dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period
after bank j becomes subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. In Column 1, the unit of observation is at
facility-level, there is one observation per lead arranger-facility pair, and the dependent variable lead shareijt
corresponds to the amount that lead arranger commits to a facility. In Column 2–3, the unit of observation is
at the package-level, and there is one observation per lead arranger-package pair. In Column 2, the dependent
variable log(total lenders)ijt is the natural logarithm of the total number of participants at loan origination.
In Column 3, the variable non-bank leadijt takes the value of one if the loan ijt has a non-bank lead arranger.
Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for the type of
loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of the lender j. The bottom of the
table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering
at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2017).
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Table 4: Risk-sensitive capital, loan maturity and interest rate
Intensive Margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: log(maturity)ijt log(bankmaturity)ijt log(non-bank maturity)ijt allindrawnijt
eventjt -0.1034*** -0.1018*** -0.0806 5.0367
(0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0579) (8.5479)
Observations 6175 6079 3268 6124
R-squared 0.395 0.386 0.451 0.453
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports results concerning bank lending from Equation 1 and 2. The sample is reduced to speculative-
grade loans. The dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period after bank j becomes subject to
the risk-sensitive capital regulation. In Column 1–3, the unit of observation is package-level, and there is one
observation per lead arranger-package pair. In Column 1, the variable log(maturity)ijt is the natural logarithm
of the maximum maturity of a facility in a package (i.e., how long in months a facility will be active from signing
to expiration date). The variable log(bank maturity)ijt in Column 2 is the natural logarithm of the maximum
maturity of a bank tranche (i.e., facility including bank participants), and the variable log(non-bank maturity)ijt
in Column 3 is the natural logarithm of the maximum maturity of a non-bank tranche (i.e., facility including
non-bank participants) in a package. In Column 4, the unit of observation is at the facility-level; there is
one observation per lead arranger-facility pair, and the dependent variable allindrawnijt corresponds to the
amount that borrower i pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, including the fees.
Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for the type of
loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of lender j. The bottom of the
table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering
at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2017).
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Table 5: Default Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Speculative-grade Non-speculative-grade All loans
Dep. Var.: defaultijt bankruptijt defaultijt bankruptijt defaultijt bankruptijt
eventjt 0.0828*** 0.0724*** -0.0604* -0.0558* 0.0220 0.0163
(0.0276) (0.0256) (0.0340) (0.0294) (0.0233) (0.0170)
Observations 4575 4575 7005 7005 11580 11580
R-squared 0.245 0.256 0.222 0.226 0.172 0.180
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lead Arranger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3. In Columns 1 to 2, the sample is reduced
to speculative-grade loans, and in Columns 3 to 4, it is restricted to non-speculative-grade loans. Columns 5-6
include all Dealscan loans. In Columns 1, 3, and 4, the dependent variable defaultijt takes the value of one if
firm i defaults any time within five years of taking out the loan. Default is defined as any event classified as
default by the Moody’s Default and Recovery Database (DRD). In Columns 2, 4, and 6, the dependent variable
bankruptijt takes the value of one if the borrower goes bankrupt any time within five years of taking out a loan.
Bankruptcy is any event classified as bankruptcy by the Moody’s Default and Recovery Database (DRD). The
dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period after bank j becomes subject to the risk-sensitive
capital regulation. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies
for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of lender j. The
bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct
for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan and DRD (1990-2013).
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Loan Purpose FE Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes
Lender State FE Yes
Lead Arranger FE Yes
Cluster Lender
This table reports the results concerning changes in ex ante borrower riskiness. I replace the dependent variable
in Equation 3 with debt/assetsit−1. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to risk-
sensitive capital regulation. The variable debt/assetsit−1 is the debt to assets ratio of borrower i one year
prior to loan origination. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and
dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of lender
j. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors
correct for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan and Compustat (1990-2017).
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Table 7: Default Risk with Trends and Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: defaultijt
eventjt 0.0799*** 0.0936*** 0.0828*** 0.0914*** 0.0800***









Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575 3409
R-squared 0.441 0.293 0.245 0.475 0.292
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No Yes No
Sales-Year FE No No Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes No Yes No Yes
Borrower State FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Lead Arranger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3 and controlling for trends and observables
at loan origination. The dependent variable defaultijt is one if firm i defaults any time within five years of
taking out the loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to the risk-sensitive
capital regulation. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and
dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and the parent country of
lender j. log(amountijt) is the total size of the loan, log(maturityijt) is the maximum maturity on the loan,
allindrawnijt is the rate on the loan, and debt/assetsit−1 is the indebtedness of the borrower one year before
loan origination. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering.
Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan, Compustat and
DRD (1990-2013).
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Table 8: Heterogeneity by Lead Arranger Monitoring Expertise and Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Monitoring Lending Lending Industry Relation
Incentives Relation Expertise Expertise Length
Dep. Var.: defaultijt
eventjt 0.0797*** 0.0794*** 0.0923*** 0.0888*** 0.1403***
(0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0288) (0.0281) (0.0417)
eventjt*low lead sharejt 0.2606***
(0.0539)
eventjt*prior lending relationjt 0.0538**
(0.0252)
eventjt*low lending expertisejt -0.1905***
(0.0593)
eventjt*low industry expertisejt -0.1233***
(0.0433)
eventjt*short relationwith borrowerjt -0.0694**
(0.0316)
Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575
R-squared 0.246 0.248 0.247 0.247 0.246
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3 for loans with different levels of lead bank
expertise and incentives at loan origination. The dependent variable defaultijt is one if firm i defaults any time
within five years of taking out the loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to
risk-sensitive capital regulation. The variable low lead shareijt takes the value of one if lead arranger j has less
than 5% participation in loan ijt at loan origination and zero otherwise. The variable prior lending relationijt
is one if lead arranger j originated a loan for borrower i before the event. The variable low lending expertisejt
takes the value of one if lead arranger j has less than five years of lending expertise at time t (i.e., the number
of years spent at time t after arranging its first loan). The variable low industry expertiseijt has the value
of one if lead arranger j has less than five years of industry-specific lending expertise at time t (i.e., the
number of years spent at time t after arranging the first loan in the industry of borrower i). The variable
short relation with borrowerijt is one if lead arranger j has less than five years of lending relation with borrower
i at time t (i.e., the number of years spent at time t after arranging the first loan for borrower i). Controls
include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for the type of loan, state
of firm i, industry of firm i, state of the lender j, and parent country of lender j. The bottom of the table
provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at
the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Heterogeneity by Non-Bank Participant Monitoring Expertise and Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bank Lending Industry Relation Monitoring
Affiliation Expertise Expertise Length Incentives
Dep. Var.: defaultijt
eventjt 0.0344 0.0320 0.0299 0.0361 0.0314
(0.0347) (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0341)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt 0.0334* 0.0510*** 0.0475*** 0.0373** 0.0557***
(0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0189)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt*no bank affiliationijt 0.1196***
(0.0445)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt*low lending expertiseijt 0.1501*
(0.0890)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt*low industry expertiseijt 0.1604**
(0.0623)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt*short relation with borrowerijt 0.0786**
(0.0319)
eventjt*non-bank loanijt*low loan shareijt 0.0411
(0.0312)
Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575
R-squared 0.249 0.247 0.248 0.258 0.247
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3 for loans with different levels of non-bank
participant monitoring expertise and incentives at loan origination. The dependent variable defaultijt takes
the value of one if firm i defaults any time within five years of taking out the loan. The dummy variable eventjt
is one after bank j becomes subject to risk-sensitive capital regulation. The variable non-bank loanijt takes
the value of one if loan ijt is either originated by a syndicate including non-banks or it has a non-bank term
tranche. The variable no bank affiliationijt is one if loan ijt has a non-bank participant that is not affiliated with
banks. The variable low lending expertiseijt has the value of one if the average lending expertise of non-bank
participants in the syndicate at loan origination is less than five years. The variable low industry expertiseijt
has the value of one if the average industry-specific lending expertise of non-bank participants in the syndicate
is less than five years. The variable short relation with borrowerijt is one if the average length of lending relation
with borrower i of non-bank participants in the syndicate is less than five years. The variable low loan shareijt
takes one if the average loan share of non-banks in the syndicate at loan origination is less than 5% and zero
otherwise. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for the
type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of lender j. The bottom
of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for
clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Heterogeneity by Bank Participant Monitoring Expertise and Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lending Expertise Industry Expertise Relation Length Monitoring Incentives
Dep. Var.: defaultijt
eventjt 0.0879*** 0.0843*** 0.1163*** 0.0826***
(0.0291) (0.0281) (0.0394) (0.0278)
eventjt*low lending expertiseijt -0.0807
(0.0697)
eventjt*low industry expertiseijt -0.0830
(0.0615)
eventjt*short relation with borrowerijt -0.0417
(0.0303)
eventjt*low loan shareijt 0.0445
(0.0684)
Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575
R-squared 0.246 0.246 0.246 0.246
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3 for loans with different levels of bank
participant monitoring expertise and incentives. The dependent variable defaultijt is one if firm i defaults
within five years of taking out the loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject
to risk-sensitive capital regulation. The variable low lending expertiseijt takes the value of one if the average
lending expertise of bank participants at loan origination is less than five years (i.e., the average of number
of years spent by each bank participant at time t after their first loan). The variable low industry expertiseijt
has the value of one if the average industry-specific lending expertise of bank participants at loan origination
is less than five years (i.e., the average number of years spent by each bank participant at time t after their
first loan in the industry of borrower i). The variable short relation with borrowerijt is one if the average
length of lending relation with borrower i of bank participants at loan origination is less than five years (i.e.,
the average number of years spent by each bank participant at time t after their first loan to borrower i).
The variable low loan shareijt takes the value of one if the average loan share of bank participants at loan
origination is less than 5% and zero otherwise. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan
as sales at close), and dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and
parent country of lender j. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of
clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Regulatory treatment of corporate exposures
Source: Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework - Comprehensive Version (2006), p.23
Figure 2: Regulatory treatment of securitisation exposures
Source: Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework - Comprehensive Version (2006), p.135
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Figure 3: Countries that adopted risk-sensitive capital (2004-2014)
45
Figure 4: Lead Share in Speculative-grade Deals around Risk-Sensitive Capital
This figure shows the share of loans that lead banks allocate to a given facility for speculative-grade
loans originated by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that become subject to the risk-sensitive
capital regulation during the sample period. To compute the lead shares on the y-axis, I align contracts
around the year of risk-sensitive capital regulation and calculate the average lead bank share for all
contracts with the same distance to the regulation. The x-axis displays the distance to lead banks’
exposure to the regulation in years. The value zero indicates the year in which the lead bank becomes
subject to the regulation. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2017).
Figure 5: Lead Share Distribution around Risk-sensitive Capital
This figure depicts the kernel density plots of the share of loans that lead banks allocate to a given
facility for speculative-grade loans originated by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that become
subject to risk-sensitive capital during the sample period before the regulation (grey line) and after
the regulation (black line).
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Figure 6: Change in Non-Bank Lead Participation around Risk-sensitive Capital
This figure shows the probability of having a non-bank lead arranger for speculative-grade loans
originated by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that adopt the risk-sensitive capital regulation
during the sample period. To compute the % of lead non-bank loans on the y-axis, I align contracts
around the year of risk-sensitive capital regulation and calculate the share of loans with a non-bank
laed arranger for all contracts with the same distance to the regulation. The x-axis displays the
distance to lead banks’ exposure to the regulation in years. The value zero indicates the year in which
the lead bank becomes subject to the regulation. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2017).
Figure 7: Change in Ex post Borrower Default around Risk-sensitive Capital
This figure shows the probability of ex post borrower defaults for speculative-grade loans originated
by the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that adopt the risk-sensitive capital regulation during the
sample period. To compute the % of default outcomes on the y-axis, I align contracts around the year
of risk-sensitive capital regulation and calculate the average market-adjusted ex post borrower default
for all contracts with the same distance to the regulation. The x-axis displays the distance to lead
banks’ exposure to the regulation in years. The value zero indicates the year in which the lead bank
becomes subject to the regulation. Sources: Dealscan (1990-2013) and Moody’s DRD (1990-2017).
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Figure 8: Different Default Windows
This figure shows the coefficient estimate on Equation 3 and 95% CI using ex post default outcomes
with different default windows after loan origination.
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Appendix to “The Shadow Disintermediation of Risk-sensitive Capital”
Irem Erten
LBS
This appendix has two sections. Section A contains additional information on descriptive
statistics and variable definitions. Section B presents additional results and robustness checks.
A Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A1 reports the summary statistics. Panel A presents the event statistics, and Panel B
depicts the summary statistics on the speculative-grade loan sample. In Panel B, the average
lead share is 25.87% and the average interest rate on the loan is 281.51 basis points. Speculative-
grade loans have, on average, a maturity of 60 months (5 years) and around two syndicate
participants at loan origination. The average default rate within a five-year window after
taking out a speculative-grade loan is 16%, and the average bankruptcy rate is 13%. On
average, 17% of speculative-grade loans have a non-bank lead arranger and 77% of them have
a non-bank participant or a non-bank term tranche. Panel C presents the Compustat sample14.
[Table A1 here]
A.2 Variables
Table A2 reports the variable definitions.
[Table A2 here]
14I require that there exist at least one loan in Dealscan to the company
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Event Statistics
Event Year # Affected Banks # Total Banks # Treated deals # Total deals # Treated/# Total deals
2004 9 187 31 511 0.06
2005 20 155 162 486 0.33
2006 12 161 160 448 0.36
2007 16 154 181 442 0.41
2008 17 153 79 167 0.47
2009 7 130 74 202 0.37
2010 8 156 151 286 0.53
2011 11 158 165 354 0.47
2012 6 151 153 267 0.57
2013 8 171 230 358 0.64
2014 6 168 156 259 0.60
Panel B: Loan-Level Data
Variable Mean Min Max Obs. Data Source
Lead share: 25.87 0 100 3560 Dealscan
Allindrawn (max. in a package): 281.51 5 1500 6742 Dealscan
# Total lenders: 1.98 1 19 6947 Dealscan
Default rate: 0.16 0 1 6600 Moody’s
Bankruptcy rate: 0.13 0 1 6600 Moody’s
Maturity (months): 60 1 301 6823 Dealscan
Non-bank lead: 0.17 0 1 6947 Dealscan
Non-bank institutional loan: 0.77 0 1 6947 Dealscan
Panel C: Firm-Level Data
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Data Source
Total assets (in millions) 10991.32 448.75 89467.30 144267 Compustat
Total debt/assets 0.21 0.26 0.26 80413 Compustat
Long-term debt/assets 0.23 0.18 0.23 143739 Compustat
Investment/assets 0.06 0.04 0.07 133963 Compustat
EBIT/assets 0.02 0.07 0.23 136036 Compustat
Cash/assets 0.10 0.04 0.13 141201 Compustat
Closing stock price 32.73 14.50 897.65 128686 Compustat
Panel A provides information on the event, including the number of lead banks that become subject to risk-
sensitive capital regulation each year, total number of lead banks in Dealscan, the number of speculative-grade
deals originated by affected banks, the total number of speculative-grade deals, and the ratio of speculative-
grade deals originated by affected banks to the total number of speculative-grade deals. Panel B depicts
the loan-level data, which comprises lead share, interest rate (allindrawn), # total lenders (total number of
participants in the deal at loan origination), default (a dummy variable that takes one if the borrower defaults
within five years of taking out the loan), bankruptcy (a dummy variable that is one if the borrower goes
bankrupt within five years of taking out the loan), maturity of the deal in months, non-bank lead (a dummy
that is one if deal has a non-bank lead arranger), and non-bank institutional loan (a dummy that takes one if
loan is either originated by non-banks or has a non-bank term tranche). Panel C depicts the Compustat data
for the firms which appear in Dealscan at least once during the sample period. Sources: Dealscan, Compustat,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.1 Hazard model: Adoption of the rules
One concern is that countries adopt risk-sensitive capital requirements when banks relax lend-
ing standards due to macroeconomic conditions. If banks relax lending standards on a con-
solidated basis, the impact of the regulation on U.S. subsidiaries may be endogenous. In this
part of my analysis, I use a hazard model to rule out this concern.
I first include variables such as inflation and GDP growth to see whether macroeconomic
factors predict the adoption decision. Macroeconomic conditions might matter since in eco-
nomic booms, banks might lower lending standards during booms due to improved borrowers’
future income and collateral prospects that increases their risk tolerance. Next, I include
variables that capture the level of economic development — such as GDP per capita, pop-
ulation size, population growth, and the size of domestic credit market by banks. Because
risk-sensitive capital requires the adoption of an extensive risk management system that has
to be certified by the regulator, it imposes a significant compliance cost on both regulators
and banks. Thus, countries with a large banking sector and a high level of economic develop-
ment are more likely to welcome such regulations. I also add proxies that capture the level of
concentration in the banking sector. Large incumbents could lobby for the regulation because
it reduces overall capital requirements for large banks – generating a competitive advantage
(Behn, Haselmann and Vig, 2016). Finally, I include the average level of bank capitalization. If
banks are under-capitalized, countries might introduce capital rules to require banks to improve
their risk management and to become better capitalized.
Table B1 presents results from the Cox proportional hazard model. The methodology does
not impose any structure on the baseline hazard rate, and it calculates relative hazard rates
for one-unit changes in the right-hand-side variables. As exhibited in Column (1), inflation
and GDP per capita growth cannot predict the adoption decision. In Column (2), I find that
population size and growth do not seem to matter either. In Column (3), however, I show that
GDP per capita has a positive and statistically significant impact. In fact, a unit change in
GDP per capita increases the relative hazard ratio by 0.7%. Furthermore, a unit change in the
size of the domestic credit market increases the relative hazard ratio by 1%. In Column (4) and
(5), I find concentration and capitalization in the banking sector do not play a significant role
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in the adoption of the regulation. In Column (6), however, the coefficient on GDP per capita
is positive but no longer significant. Thus, the only factor that is consistently significant and
economically meaningful is the size of the domestic market for bank credit. Overall, the hazard
model supports that risk-sensitive capital regulation is exogenous to the U.S. subsidiaries: it
is not correlated with macroeconomic conditions that coincide with the lending standards of
the parent banks. It is instead linked to the size of the domestic credit market – a persistent
characteristic of the home economies.
[Table B1 here]
Table B1: Hazard Model - Determinants of the adoption decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Population (in millions) 0.00009 -0.00025
(0.00034) (0.00052)
Population growth 0.02666 0.04525
(0.03246) (0.04392)
Private credit to GDP by banks 0.00782*** 0.01004***
(0.00254) (0.00294)
GDP per capita (in thousands) 0.01139** 0.00690
(0.00523) (0.00646)




Observations 1390 1685 1204 1690 951 731
Log-likelihood -309.361 -345.161 -295.831 -345.268 -295.539 -259.385
p-value of chi2 for regression 0.042 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows the results from the Cox proportional hazard model to understand the decision to adopt the
risk-sensitive capital regulation. The coefficients represent the relative hazard rates for one-unit changes in the
independent variables. Standard errors correct for clustering at the country-level, and they are reported in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Sources: World Bank, Bankscope and FRED (1990-2015).
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B.2 Do shadow banks learn from adverse selection?
In this section, I investigate whether shadow banks learn over time from adverse selection
vis-à-vis lead arrangers. To do so, I test whether lead arrangers with a high rate of historical
defaults become less likely to distribute speculative-grade loans to shadow banks. The results
are collected in Table B2. In Column 1, I show that a lead arranger with a high track record
of borrower defaults (greater than 10%) within the last five years becomes 10% less likely to
sell loans to non-banks in the secondary loan markets. The impact is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level. In Column 2, I find that lead banks with a track record of high
borrower defaults is 4.84% less likely to syndicate a loan to non-banks in the primary loan
markets. However, the effect is not statistically significant. In Column 3, I show that banks
with high borrower defaults do not become less likely to co-originate loans with non-banks.
These results are consistent with the view that banks whose borrowers have a high historical
rate of default ex post experience reputational effects towards non-banks in the secondary loan
markets. Thus, adverse selection vis-à-vis shadow banks is likely to be unwillingly internalized
by secondary loan market non-bank participants that do not play any monitoring role.
[Table B2 here]
B.3 Do shadow banks have additional motives?
In this section, I exploit lender type heterogeneity to understand whether shadow banks in-
vested in risky loans due to additional motives. For example, participating in the syndicated
loan market might enable lenders to gain access to deal flow or other sources of revenue (Ben-
melech Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012). If this is true, then defaults should be higher for shadow
banks that are more likely to have additional motives. Insurance companies, for example, might
be willing to accept higher risk because investing in syndicated loans could lead to fees from
cross-selling other products. Similarly, hedge funds and mutual funds might be willing to pay
a discount because they could use the private information obtained in the loan market to trade
in other securities (Ivashina and Sun, 2011). To test for additional motives, I interact eventjt
with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if loanijt has an institutional investor of a
specific type. The results are collected in Table B3.
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Table B2: Non-bank response to adverse selection
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: non-bank term loanijt non-bank participantijt non-bank leadijt
high historical defaultsjt -0.1069** -0.0484 0.0219
(0.0440) (0.0377) (0.0216)
Observations 5087 5087 5087
R-squared 0.263 0.269 0.570
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender
This table tests whether lead banks with a high track record of ex post borrower defaults become less
likely to distribute speculative-grade loans to shadow banks. In Columns 1 to 3, the independent variable
high historical defaultsjt takes the value of one if more than 10% of the borrowers of bank j defaulted within
the last five years. In Column 1, the dependent variable non-bank term loanijt is one if loan ijt is sold to
non-banks in the secondary loan markets. The variable non-bank participant is one if loan ijt has a non-bank
participant at loan origination. The variable non-bank leadijt takes the value of one if the loan contract ijt is
co-originated with a non-bank lead arranger in the syndicate at loan origination. Controls include the log of
firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry
of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of lender j. The bottom of the table provides information
about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan and DRD (1990-2017).
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[Table B3 here]
I find no evidence that the affected speculative-grade loans distributed to insurance com-
panies are more likely to default (column 5), which does not support the view that insurance
companies accept higher credit risk to capture other businesses. Similarly, the results do not
support the claim that hedge funds and mutual funds bear higher risk for motives such as access
to private information. Instead, I find that loans allocated to hedge funds and mutual funds
after the reform are not systematically riskier. While the difference in defaults for loans in
which mutual funds invested is positive (Column 3), it is not significant. The loans distributed
to hedge funds are 15.95 points less likely to lead to ex post default (Column 6).
On the other hand, loans distributed to finance companies are significantly more likely
to exhibit defaults (Column 1). Finance companies typically specialize in extending credit
to risky businesses and consumers. Thus, they are unlikely to invest in syndicated loans for
other sources of revenue. Loans extended to investors classified as corporations by Dealscan
are also 7.61 percentage points more likely to exhibit defaults (Column 2). This group of
investors include non-financial technology and manufacturing firms such as General Electric
Co, and General Motors, which are likely to be the non-bank type with the least monitoring
expertise in corporate lending, in addition to investment management companies such as KKR
& Co, Bain Capital Credit, and Golub Capital that are active CLO managers – with arguably
weakest monitoring incentives (Benmelech Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012). Hence, I do not
find evidence that shadow banks invested in riskier loans for motives such as access to other
businesses. Instead, defaults are higher for the types of shadow banks that are most likely to be
uninformed about loan quality. However, I cannot rule out the possibility that they willingly
accept a discount on the loans to gain market share in syndicated lending.
B.4 Is the rise in default risk due to ex post execution?
The higher incidence of defaults after the regulation could be driven by the possibility that
banks become systematically less capable of executing syndicated loan contracts (e.g., less
able to renegotiate effectively) under the new rules. To rule out this concern, I compare
loans originated and maturing before the regulation, with the loans originated before, but
maturing after the regulation. If loan execution is systematically worse after the regulation,
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Table B3: Default risk – Non-bank Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: defaultijt
eventijt 0.0430 0.0720*** 0.0810*** 0.0824*** 0.0817*** 0.0834***













Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575
R-squared 0.248 0.246 0.246 0.245 0.245 0.245
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk for loan contracts with different types of non-bank insti-
tutional investor involvement in the syndicate at loan origination. In Columns 1 to 6, the dependent variable
defaultijt takes the value of one if firm i defaults any time within five years of taking out the loan. The
dummy variable eventjt is one in the post-regulation period after bank j becomes subject to risk-sensitive
capital regulation. The variable finance companyijt is one if loan ijt has a lender identified by Dealscan as
"Finance Company" or "Leasing Company", and the variable corporationijt has the value of one if loan ijt has
a participant categorized by Dealscan as "Corporation". The variable mutual fundijt takes the value of one if
loan ijt has a lender identified by Dealscan as an "Inst. Invest. Prime Fd.", "Mutual Fund", or "Pension Fund".
The variable collateralized loan obligationijt takes the value of one if loan ijt has a participant categorized by
Dealscan as "Inst. Invest. CDO". The variable insurance companyijt is one if loan ijt has a participant iden-
tified by Dealscan as "Inst. Invest. Insur. Co." or "Insurance Company". The variable hedge fundijt has the
value of one if loan ijt has a lender categorized by Dealscan as "Distressed (Vulture) Fund" and "Inst. Invest.
Hedge Fd". Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan as sales at close), and dummies for
the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and parent country of the lender j. The
bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct
for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan and DRD (1990-2013).
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then borrower defaults should also rise for loans that were originated, but are executed under
the new rules. The results are collected in Table B4, Columns 1–4. I observe no differences
in the probability of default. Thus, the rise in default risk is not due to the lead bank’s deal
execution ability after the reform.
[Table B4 here]
Table B4: Default Risk: Execution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Speculative-grade Non-speculative-grade
Dep. Var.: defaultijt bankruptijt defaultijt bankruptijt
loan originated before the eventijt -0.0332 -0.0002 -0.0220 0.0138
(0.1329) (0.1344) (0.1194) (0.1096)
loan originated before but maturing after the eventijt -0.0272 -0.0756 -0.0642 -0.0645
(0.1576) (0.1475) (0.1509) (0.1411)
Observations 4575 4575 7005 7005
R-squared 0.244 0.255 0.221 0.225
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using Equation 3. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent
variable defaultijt takes the value of one if firm i defaults any time within five years of taking out the loan.
In Columns 2 and 4, the dependent variable bankruptijt takes the value of one if the borrower goes bankrupt
any time within five years of taking out a loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes
subject to the risk-sensitive capital regulation. The dummy variable loan originated before the eventjt is one
if the loan is granted before the risk-sensitive capital regulation and zero otherwise. The dummy variable loan
originated before but maturing after the eventjt is one if the loan is granted before, but matures after the risk-
sensitive capital regulation, and zero otherwise. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan
as sales at close), and dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of lender j, and
parent country of lender j. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of
clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan
and DRD (1990-2013).
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B.5 Who bears the increase in default risk?
In this section, I provide a back-of-envelope test to understand who bears the increase in default
risk. I first calculate in the old regime the average default risk of the lead bank in a high yield
loan as 0.039 (default risk multiplied by loan share before the reform). In the new regime,
the new default risk multiplied by the new loan share and the probability of extending the
high yield loan yields 0.0342 (48 basis points lower than before the regulation). Bank tranches
mature much earlier than shadow bank tranches (45 months as opposed to 65 months), and the
increase in default risk for a four year-window is around 5%. However, the rise in default risk
for a five-year window is 8%. The back-of-envelope tests imply that although banks originate
riskier loans, they bear less risk due to loan sales. However, credit risk distributed to the
shadow banking system significantly rises.
[Table B5 here]
Table B5: Default Risk Exposure
Lead Bank Exposure Before After
Default Risk 0.15 0.20
Loan Share 0.26 0.19
Default Risk Exposure 0.039 0.038
Default Risk Exposure*P(High Yield Loan) 0.0342
Shadow Bank Exposure Before After
Default Risk 0.15 0.23
Default Risk*P(High Yield Loan) 0.207
B.6 Robustness
In this section, I formally test for pre-trends in the increase in default probability after the
regulation. To do so, I define the dummy variables eventj∗t−1, eventj∗t−2, and eventj∗t−3, that
take the value of one at one, two and three years prior to the regulation, respectively. I find that
all these coefficients are insignificant at a 10% level. Hence, there is no evidence of pre-trends.
I present these results in Table B6.
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[Table B6 here]
Another concern is that I exploit cross-sectional variation in incentives and information –
which likely correlate with other time-varying confounding factors. To mitigate this concern, I
run separate tests in which I interact the event dummy with other candidate confounds such as
time-varying state, industry and size trends. Results are presented in Table B7. The estimate
of interest ranges between 0.24 and 0.27 and it is only slightly affected.
[Table B7 here]
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Table B6: Default Risk Pre-trends
(1) (2)











Year FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender
This table reports the results concerning default risk using from Equation 3. In Columns 1, the dependent
variable defaultijt takes the value of one if firm i defaults any time within five years of taking out the loan.
In Columns 2, the dependent variable bankruptijt takes one if the borrower goes bankrupt within five years of
taking out a loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to the risk-sensitive capital
regulation. The dummy variables eventj∗t−1, eventj∗t−2, and eventj∗t−3 take the value of one at one, two and
three years prior to the regulation, respectively. Controls include the log of firm i’s sales (defined by Dealscan
as sales at close), and dummies for the type of loan, state of firm i, industry of firm i, state of the lender j, and
parent country of lender j. The bottom of the table provides information about fixed-effects, and the level of
clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan
and DRD (1990-2013).
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Table B7: Lead Share Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
defaultijt
treatedj -0.0399 -0.0397 -0.0423* -0.0404 -0.0529** -0.0360
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0240)
eventjt 0.1612 0.1579*** -0.0227 0.0801*** 0.0805*** 0.0750***
(0.3486) (0.0430) (0.0292) (0.0280) (0.0286) (0.0283)
eventjt*low lead sharejt 0.2512*** 0.2350*** 0.2322*** 0.2490*** 0.2693*** 0.2706***
(0.0563) (0.0544) (0.0578) (0.0564) (0.0744) (0.0529)
low lead sharejt -0.0503 -0.0511 -0.0496 -0.0498 -0.0452 -0.0556
(0.0463) (0.0464) (0.0456) (0.0464) (0.0486) (0.0465)
treatedj*low lead sharejt -0.1390** -0.1366** -0.1286** -0.1394** -0.1226* -0.1430**
(0.0604) (0.0608) (0.0590) (0.0606) (0.0732) (0.0586)
Observations 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575 4575
R-squared 0.246 0.248 0.250 0.246 0.206 0.216
Size - Event FE Yes No No No No No
Industry - Event FE No Yes No No No No
State - Event FE No No Yes No No No
Size - Year FE No No No Yes No No
Industry - Year FE No No No No Yes No
State - Year FE No No No No No Yes
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Borrower State FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Parent Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
This table adds time-varying trends to default risk for loans with different levels of lead bank incentives at
loan origination. The dependent variable defaultijt takes the value of one if firm i defaults any time within
five years of taking out the loan. The dummy variable eventjt is one after bank j becomes subject to the
risk-sensitive capital regulation. The variable low lead shareijt takes one if lead arranger j has less than 5%
participation in loan ijt at loan origination and zero otherwise. The bottom of the table provides information
about fixed-effects, and the level of clustering. Standard errors correct for clustering at the lender-level, and
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Sources: Dealscan and DRD (1990-2013).
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